Energy Tribune

Bryce Interviews Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, About Iraq and Us Foreign Policy

May 30, 2008

Andrew J. Bacevich is a professor of international relations at Boston University. A graduate of the U. S. Military Academy, he received his Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton University. Bacevich left the Army with the rank of colonel. He joined the faculty at Boston University in 1998.

Before that, he taught at West Point and at Johns Hopkins University. He has authored several books, including American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy and The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War. He has been among the most persistent critics of the Bush administration’s war in Iraq, which he has called a “catastrophic failure.” His book, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, will be published in August.

ET: You are a well-known critic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Given that the U.S. is bogged down in Iraq, where should U.S. policy in the region be headed? Do you favor an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops?

AB: The Bush administration embarked upon the war in Iraq because it saw Iraq as the place to jumpstart a larger project of politically transforming the greater Middle East. That project has now demonstrably failed and there is no turning it around. Therefore, continuing the Iraq War serves no plausible strategic purpose – it needs to be closed down.

ET: U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf is inevitably tied up with U.S. energy policy (or lack thereof). What should the U.S. be doing with regard to its energy policy?

AB: No doubt the Persian Gulf will remain important to the world economy for decades. However, anything that we can do to increase our strategic freedom of action is to the good. That means pursuing ways to make ourselves less dependent on energy from sources outside of the Western Hemisphere.

ET: In a recent piece for Commonweal, you wrote that the U.S. has “too much war and too few warriors.” You also made it clear that the U.S. should be pursuing a policy of containment when it comes to radical Islam. Does that mean we should be reducing our military spending? If so, which elements of the Defense Department budget should be cut first?

AB: A strategy of containment ought to cost less than a strategy of transformation, especially when such a strategy requires us to invade, occupy, and rebuild other countries. So, yes, I would hope that we could substantially reduce our defense spending, perhaps getting it down into the area where it was prior to Bush’s invasion of Iraq. My priorities would be to maintain our air and maritime strength also with our special operations capabilities.

ET: Your forthcoming book discusses the limits of America’s ability to project power, particularly given the parlous state of the U.S. economy, the overextended military, and the disarray in Congress and the White House. Your book talked about the need for “realism.” What does that mean?

AB: It means several things, but above all, recognizing that our power is finite and that the expansionist impulse that is central to our foreign policy is now squandering rather than enhancing our power. It is making us weaker, not stronger.

ET: The Second Iraq War has clearly had winners and losers. I have argued that Iran has been strengthened by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Do you agree? And who, other than the U.S. and Iraq, have been “losers” as a result of the war?

AB: No doubt about it – Iran is the main winner. But we should not overstate the consequences. Iran does not pose a real threat to the U.S. The Iranian Revolution is a spent force. The prospects of Iran evolving on a course that will be consistent with our interests are considerable.

Israel is the other big loser. Expectations that overthrowing Saddam would enhance Israel’s security have not been met. If anything, the reverse is true.

ET: Over the long run, what are the most important things that the U.S. should be doing to improve its standing in the world – morally, politically, and militarily?

AB: Demonstrate prudence – there’s nothing more disturbing than a superpower that behaves recklessly, as we have done since 9/11.

ET: If the U.S. makes all the right moves to repair its image, its military, and its finances, how long will it take for the U.S. to regain its stature in the world? Or has the Second Iraq War forever damaged the American “brand”?

AB: It took a decade or so for us to restore our reputation after the debacle of Vietnam. I expect that it will take at least that long this time.

ET: When it comes to radical Islamic terrorism, it appears that you are not as alarmist as many others. You wrote in Commonweal that radical Islam is a serious but “not existential” threat to American security. Many politicos have made the opposite claim, arguing that we are in a fight for survival, that we’ve begun “World War IV,” and that we are in a fight to the death with Islam. It seems to me that their view, not yours, has largely prevailed. Am I wrong?

AB: I think you misread the direction of events. Robert Kagan, the influential neoconservative, has a new book coming out called The Return of History. He uses it among other things to indicate his belief that political Islam is doomed to fail. He calls it a “hopeless dream.” He’s correct. That doesn’t mean we don’t need to keep our guard up. But we should not see the fight against “Islamofascism” as akin to a “World War IV.” That’s nonsense. My guess – or hope – is that once this administration is gone, a more sober approach might prevail.